Edda 2/7 C on stream123 never came back

Alexander L Kielland – Norway’s worst-ever industrial accident

person by Kristin Øye Gjerde, Norwegian Petroleum Museum
”Mayday, Mayday, Alexander Kie...” Baste Fanebust, shipping coordinator at the Ekofisk Complex, was one of those who picked up this SOS at 18.30 on 27 March 1980. The Alexander L Kielland flotel (accommodation rig) was in the process of capsizing.
— Photo: Einar Andersen/Norwegian Petroleum Museum
© Norsk Oljemuseum
Kielland
Ship Coordinator, Baste Fanebust, told all ships in the area to go to the scene of the accident.. Photo: Husmo Foto/Norwegian Petroleum Museum

Unable to believe his ears, Fanebust stopped to listen but heard no more. He was soon in contact with supply ship Normand Engineer, which lay two nautical miles north of the flotel. It had also picked up the Mayday call and wanted to sail immediately to investigate. Normand Skipper was ordered to do the same.

The rescue operation was difficult. Night was falling and a gale blowing. In just 20 minutes, the inconceivable had occurred – fatigue failure in a bracing had caused one of the flotel’s five legs to tear off. The unbalanced unit then tipped over. [REMOVE]Fotnote: Kvendseth, Stig S, Giant Discovery. A History of Ekofisk Through the First 20 Years, 1988: 144-145.

Chaos prevailed on board as the list became more and more pronounced. Much went wrong with lowering the lifeboats. Many of those on board had no chance, and 123 people died. Just 89 survived the worst industrial accident in Norwegian history.

The wreck

«Alexander L. Kielland»-ulykken,
Alexander Kielland. Photo: Emil Hohlenberg (Public Domain)

Named for a well-known 19th century Stavanger novelist, Alexander L Kielland had originally been commissioned as a drilling rig by the Stavanger Drilling company. It was built to the French Pentagone design at France’s Companie Francaise d’Entreprises Metalliques (CFEM) yard in 1976.

On Greater Ekofisk, the rig was used solely as a flotel and had been moored from the summer of 1979 alongside the Edda platform, a few kilometres south-west of the Ekofisk Complex.

It was linked to Edda by a bridge, but this had been removed on the day of the accident because of the bad weather.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Ryggvik, Helge and Smith-Solbakken, Marie, Blod, svette og olje, Norsk oljehistorie volume 3, Oslo, 1997: 213.

The loss of one support column meant the flotel began to list. That in turn caused water to pour into the other four pontoons and into the topside decks, increasing the incline even more.

People on board strove despairingly to reach the lifeboat deck. Very few managed to collect a lifejacket from their cabin. The supply of survival suits was limited. Stocks of lifejackets around the public areas were soon exhausted.

A number of unfortunate circumstances combined to complicate evacuation. Three of the seven 50-seater lifeboats were crushed against the flotel side by the list. Only two of the remainder were used.

Those on board had received inadequate safety training, which was not mandatory for ”hotel guests” under the prevailing regulations. Most were therefore unfamiliar with the safety equipment.

Nobody was able to work the release mechanism on the inflatable rafts, which had a capacity of 400 people. A couple of them nevertheless released themselves when the rig capsized, and three men got into of them. Another 13 managed to swim across to rafts thrown from the Edda platform.

Fourteen of the people who landed directly in the icy sea were saved. Seven managed to swim to the platform and were hoisted up in personnel baskets.

The remaining survivors had succeeded in entering lifeboats and were rescued by ships or helicopters. They reported very dramatic experiences.[REMOVE]Fotnote:  Smith-Solbakken, Marie, Historien om plattformen som ikke kunne velte. I: “Alexander L. Kielland” – ulykken: Ringene i vannet. 2017, Hertervig Akademisk.

Rescue work

Several factors hampered rescue efforts. Darkness fell quickly, and fog thickened. The south-westerly wind created wave heights of six-eight metres, combined with a strong current. Temperatures were 7°C in the air and only 4°C in the sea.

So only the vessels which arrived first at the accident site had any realistic chance of rescuing survivors from the sea and from rafts.

The joint rescue coordination centre (JRCC) for southern Norway was alerted within minutes of the disaster, and an extensive rescue campaign was launched at once.

This involved aircraft, helicopters from Norway, Denmark, West Germany and the UK, and naval and civilian vessels from the whole North Sea basin.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Nerheim, Gunnar and Gjerde, Kristin Øye, Uglandrederiene. Verdensvirksomhet med lokale røtter. 1996: 378-379

Divers were mobilised in the days after the accident to do the demanding job of finding the dead and bringing them to the surface. This had to done under the capsized flotel with masses of wreckage washing around.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Gjerde, Kristin Øye and Ryggvik, Helge, On the Edge, Under Water. Offshore Diving in Norway, 2014.

What caused the accident?

1980, ulykke, alexander kielland, stag, forsidebilde,
Fatigue crack in one of the braces which held the flotel’s support columns together. Photo: ConocoPhillips/Norwegian Petroleum Museum

The commission of inquiry into the Alexander L Kielland accident submitted its findings on 6 April 1981. On 2 April 1982, the Ministry of Local Government and Labour followed up with a White Paper.

In Norwegian Official Reports (NOU) no 11 1981, the commission concluded that the accident was caused by a fatigue crack in one of the braces which held the flotel’s support columns together. This fracture occurred in a small weld holding a flange plate which supported a hydrophone – a sonar device used during drilling operations. Once the brace had parted, progressive failure of the other bracing led to the loss of the D support column. That left the flotel unbalanced and it began listing. In turn, that meant the pontoons at the base of the columns and the deck began to take on water, and the whole structure turned turtle within 20 minutes.

Granskingsrapporten for Kielland-ulykken, forsidebilde, historie,
”Alexander L. Kielland”. Photo: Unknown/Norwegian Petroleum Museum

The commission found a number of faults, including poor inspection routines and safety training. A standby ship should have been no more than 20-25 minutes from the flotel. Technical weaknesses in rescue equipment were also criticised.

New safety measures

Immediately after the accident, the Norwegian Maritime Directorate demanded that all floating units off Norway should be taken to land as soon as possible and checked for cracks.

overlevelsesdrakt, alexander l. kielland, Edda 2/7 C
Platform managers cabin at Edda 2/7 C. The survivalsuit is hanging on the wall. Photo: Kjetil Alsvik/Norwegian Petroleum Museum

Regulations were introduced which required that such floaters must remain buoyant even it one of its support columns came off – by making parts of the deck structure buoyant, for example.

In the autumn of 1980, the directorate required that all personnel on both fixed and floating units be issued with survival suits. That is perhaps the most visible outcome of the accident.

Inquiry and righting

  • 28 March 1980 – the government appoints a commission of inquiry into the Alexander L Kielland accident headed by district judge Thor Næsheim from Sandnes south of Stavanger.
  • 20 April 1980 – the flotel wreck is towed in from the field and moored in the Åmøy Fjord just north of Stavanger for more detailed investigation.
  • 7 August 1980 – Sweden’s Nicoverken and Structural Dynamics in the UK are commissioned to turn the unit right side up.
  • Late August 1980 – the wreck is towed to the Gands Fjord off Stavanger, where plans call for the righting operation to take place.
  • 27 October 1980 – the righting attempt is launched under the direction of Scott Cobus.
  • 12 November 1980 – work has to be halted for technical reasons.
  • September 1983 – After several attempts, the flotel was finally righted . Following more detailed investigations, it was finally scuttled in 700 metres of water in the Nedstrand Fjord north of Stavanger.
Alexander L. Kielland
The Alexander L. Kielland platform is lowered into the Nedstandsfjord. Photo: Knut S. Vindfallet

Witnessed rescue operation from land

Lars B Takla was a chief engineer with Phillips when the Kielland accident occurred. He reports that one of his jobs was to participate in a sub-committee for emergency preparedness in a sort of forerunner to today’s Norwegian Oil and Gas Association.

We had divided the North Sea into sectors, and this was a ’sector club’ where we collaborated across national boundaries. Ekofisk lay in the green sector, which was also responsible for Denmark and possible emergency response equipment there as well as in Germany, the southern UK and Norway.

Arne Holhjem worked with me to draw up this sector-club plan. We compiled an overview of all platforms and all standby ships to have to hand. As green sector coordinator, I was closely involved in the Kielland accident by mobilising equipment and help, and so forth.

Kielland was, of course, a floating hotel converted from a drilling rig. Demand for personnel in the area was very high while we were pursuing all these parallel developments. We had 4-5 000 people on the pipelay barges alone, so there were a huge number out there.

We’d also placed a new accommodation module on Henrik Ibsen, Kielland’s sister rig. Both these units were built for drilling, of course, but demand for such work was not that high at the time while a crying need existed for accommodation – which is why the rigs were converted to flotels.

While Kielland was already offshore, Henrik Ibsen was sent up to Stord [south of Bergen] to be fitted with a modern purpose-built hotel. This was the first of its kind in the North Sea and, for that matter, the world.

It was then made available for viewing in the harbour at Risavika [outside Stavanger]. We had allowed people to bring their families and take a look. I was out there with my wife and our two boys, and dinner was served to all the visitors after a tour.

We sat with Svein-Erik Bjørkelund, who was information manager in Phillips and responsible for all media contact. I knew him after a couple of joint visits to Teesside. While we sat there and ate, he was called over the loudspeaker and told to go to the radio shack.

He rushed out. When he returned, he said: ’I think we must go ashore at once. Something serious has happened’. I asked what this was, and he replied: ’I’m not sure, but I think it’s something terrible’.

Accompanied by my whole family, we boarded a supply ship which was shuttling back and forth between rig and harbour. My family returned home, and I went to the emergency response room at head office which was already in full swing. When we got there, 15-20 minutes or thereabouts had already passed.

On a noticeboard where messages were posted as soon as they came in, I saw it stood: ’Alexander L Kielland tilted over, 18.30’. I knew the weather was bad out there, and thought: ’Dear God, nobody’s going to be able to survive this’.

I spent about the next two days there before taking a break and going home. It’s clear that having been involved in something like this leaves a mark on you. You become conscious that such things must be avoided at all costs.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Lars A Takla interviewed by Kristin Øye Gjerde, 19 December 2002.

Edda 2/7 C on stream123 never came back
Published 28. May 2019   •   Updated 21. November 2019
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Getting the timing right

person by Trude Meland, Norwegian Petroleum Museum
The issue of work schedules for offshore personnel has been subject to constant discussion between government, employers and unions – leading to radical changes over 50 years.
— The offshore workers arrive at the platform for a new work period. Photo: Kjetil Alsvik/ConocoPhillips
© Norsk Oljemuseum

Different systems for rotating personnel between work and leisure functioned in parallel on the drilling rigs during the early years of oil exploration in the Norwegian North Sea. The most common practice was nevertheless one week on and one off. To get a holiday, people carried on working offshore until they were entitled to three weeks free in one go.

However, this arrangement proved impractical – particularly for workers who going offshore or returning home on a Saturday or Sunday. They never got a full weekend off. To stagger such change-overs, the schedule was extended to eight days offshore with eight days free. One work period in five was also dropped, so every fifth free spell was 24 days long.[REMOVE]Fotnote: This gave a working time which averaged 38 hours per week and 1 824 hours per year after holidays. That corresponded to shift work on land.

When Norway’s Working Environment Act (WEA) came into force in 1977, the permitted length of a continuous shift on land was cut. But there was no assurance that this would be applied offshore. In its original form, the Act did not permit the 12-hour working day normal on all offshore installations. So amendments were needed to adapt the legal provisions to fixed platforms.[REMOVE]Fotnote: The Act specified that working time was 36 hours over seven days for work carried out around the clock throughout the week. That represented 1 877 hours a year on average. Adjusting this for four weeks of holiday gave a net working time of 1 733 hours.

The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate argued that reducing working time offshore was impractical, with the “special character” of the oil industry requiring exemptions.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Ryggvik, H, 1999, “Fra forbilde til sikkerhetssystem i forvitring: Fremveksten av et norsk sikkerhetsregime i lys av utviklingen på britisk sokkel”, Working Paper, Volume 114, Centre for Technology and Culture, University of Oslo, printed edition. Oslo: Centre for Technology, Innovation and Culture (TIK), University of Oslo: 16. As early as 1975, however, Ekofisk operator Phillips Petroleum had agreed to working hours for its own personnel which accorded with the provisions proposed for the new Act. A royal decree of 9 July 1976 extended the existing Worker Protection Act, with certain exceptions, to the fixed installations offshore on a temporary basis.

The WEA was then applied to these facility in 1977.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Ryggvik, H, 1999, “Fra forbilde til sikkerhetssystem i forvitring: Fremveksten av et norsk sikkerhetsregime i lys av utviklingen på britisk sokkel”, Working Paper, Volume 114, Centre for Technology and Culture, University of Oslo, printed edition. Oslo: Centre for Technology, Innovation and Culture (TIK), University of Oslo: 18. This meant that offshore workers had their working time regulated and acquired legal safeguards against unfair dismissal. After long discussions, the North Sea schedule was by and large established as two weeks working offshore and three weeks free on land.

But the WEA was not applied to floating units such as rigs, and working time in that part of the oil industry continued to be regulated by Norway’s Ship Labour Act.

 An extra day

Norway’s legislation on paid holidays was amended in 1981 to give everyone a legal right to four weeks and one day off. The latter was nicknamed the “Gro Day” after Gro Harlem Brundtland, the Labour premier of the day. This meant the two weeks on/three weeks off schedule now imposed too many working hours. It was decided that the extra would be compensated as 25 hours of overtime per year.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Working time was reduced from 1 752 to 1 727 hours.

Agreement was reached in the 1986 collective pay negotiations on a 7.5-hour normal working day and a 37.5-hour week. Personnel both on land and offshore working a continuous shift also had their weekly hours cut 33.6.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Net working hours after deducting holidays were reduced from 1 752 to 1 727. To comply with these new terms, the offshore schedule was altered to two weeks at work, three weeks ashore, two weeks at work and four weeks on land.

When the Gro Day was introduced in 1981, the Labour government originally proposed introducing a full week’s extra holiday in stages over three years. But that failed to materialise. In 2000, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) proposed a fifth holiday week for all employees, which would thereby reduce the number of hours in a work-year.[REMOVE]Fotnote: That involved an additional four free days of 7.5 hours offshore (32 hours). The hours to be worked were then reduced from 1 612 to 1 580. That demand was accepted, and most workers could thereby enjoy five weeks off. This naturally had consequences offshore, but implementing it there was not a straightforward matter.

A schedule of two weeks at work and three/four weeks at home had been 19 hours short of a normal work-year. That was overcome by deducting this time from pay or leaving the first 11 hours of overtime unpaid.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Sande, Leif, “Arbeidstiden på sokkelen”, Sysla – meninger, 11 March 2015.

The new holiday deal meant that an offshore worker would be doing 12 extra hours per year. This was initially paid as overtime, which the unions found unsatisfactory. They demanded the full holiday entitlement awarded to everyone else through the introduction of a schedule of two weeks on and four off. In 2002, the Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF – today the Norwegian Oil and Gas Association) allowed local deals under the offshore agreements to adopt this two-four scheme. All the companies subject to these agreements introduced the new schedule. ConocoPhillips was among the operators to do this, in its case covering the Greater Ekofisk Area.

However, the two-four system meant workers were falling short of a work-year by 122 hours.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Working 12 hours a day for 14 days, followed by four weeks off, means that an employee works 168 hours every six-week period. That adds up to 1 460 hours per year. Annual pay was thereby cut by 7.71 per cent to take account of the reduced time worked.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Norwegian Official Reports (NOU) 2016:1, Arbeidstidsutvalget — Regulering av arbeidstid – vern og fleksibilitet. https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/nou-2016-1/id2467468/sec16. Other conditions were also set on Ekofisk. The whole offshore organisation was to be reviewed to find efficiency gains, and the agreement specified that the change would not lead to an increase in the workforce.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Pioner, “2-4-ordningen innføres”, March 2003.

Published 21. October 2019   •   Updated 21. October 2019
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Knut Åm – oil and gas veteran

person by Kristin Øye Gjerde, Norwegian Petroleum Museum
The special contribution made by Knut Åm to Phillips Petroleum Company was one reason for his appointment in 2014 as a Knight First Class of the Royal Norwegian Order of St Olav.
— Knut Åm in his office in 1993. Photo: Dag Myrestrand/ConocoPhillips
© Norsk Oljemuseum

Åm was born at Årdal in the Sogn district of western Norway in 1944, and grew up in Oppdal and Volda/Ørsta where he proved an able pupil at school. 

He opted to study mining engineering at the Norwegian Institute of Technology (NTH) in Trondheim, graduating with honours in 1967. 

Åm’s first job was with the Norwegian Geological Survey (NGU), again in Trondheim, where he worked and conducted research for six years. One of his jobs was to interpret aeromagnetic measurements of sub-surface rocks made from the air, which provide valuable information on geology and prospects for finding petroleum. In a series of publications, he described the big sedimentary basins identified in the Skagerrak between Norway and Denmark and in the Norwegian and Barents Seas. 

He joined the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) in 1974, serving as a section head in the resource department and a principal engineer in the safety department. 

That was followed by three years with Statoil, where he became the state oil company’s first vice president for research and development. His appointments at the time included chairing a research programme on offshore safety, which led to legislation enacted by the Storting (parliament) and a bigger research effort. 

Joining Phillips

olje og gassveteran knut åm,
Hovedkontoret til ConocoPhillips i Bartlesville, Oklahoma. Foto: ConocoPhillips

Åm secured a job with Phillips in 1982 and was soon sent to the head office at Bartlesville in Oklahoma to get better acquainted with the company and its corporate culture. 

After a year in the USA, he returned to the company’s Tananger office outside Stavanger and became the first Norwegian to serve as offshore manager for the Greater Ekofisk Area (GEA). 

That put him in charge of 23 platforms, with responsibility for the waterflooding programme as well as the project to jack up a number of the installations. These major developments extended the producing life of the GEA and sharply increased estimates for recoverable reserves from its fields. 

Åm led this work during difficult times, with low oil prices and the need to implement cost savings and overcome substantial financial challenges. As if that were not enough, he also taught at the University of Bergen from 1985 to 1990 as an adjunct (part-time) professor of applied geophysics. 

First Norwegian chief executive

Knut åm,
Knut Åm ved kontorpulten i 1993. Foto: Dag Myrestrand/ConocoPhillips

After heading operations in the Permian and San Juan Basins at Odessa, Texas, from 1988-91, Åm became the first Norwegian president and managing director for Phillips Petroleum Norway. 

That put him in charge of 3 000 employees in the GEA as well as in Tananger, Oslo, Teesside and Emden. This was when a redevelopment of Ekofisk was planned, along with the future cessation and removal of old platforms.[REMOVE]Fotnote: https://www.fylkesmannen.no/globalassets/fm-rogaland/dokument-fmro/felles-og-leiing/brev-og-artiklar/fm-tale-til-knut-am.pdf 

By 1996, Åm was back in Bartlesville – now as vice president and head of all exploration and production in Phillips. He stayed in that job until retiring in the USA during 1999.

Offices and committees

But his working life did not end there. Appointments from 1999 to 2007 include membership of the Statoil board – and many similar posts can be mentioned. 

Åm has been president of the Norwegian Geological Council and the Norwegian Petroleum Society, and chair of the Norwegian Oil Industry Association (now the Norwegian Oil and Gas Association). 

He led the exhibition committee of the 1996 ONS oil show in Stavanger, and has chaired Bergen’s Christian Michelsen Research institute as well as the industrial council of the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters.  

In addition to chairing Hitec ASA, he has been a director of several technology companies. 

Mention must also be made of the improved recovery committee appointed by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy with Åm as chair. This produced a report in September 2010 which presented 44 specific measures for improving the recovery factor on the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS). 

Through his work and many appointments, Åm has been acclaimed for a combination of expertise, creativity and determination.  He also demonstrated the ability to tackle the requirements of Norway as a nation as well as the industry and its employees – not least with regard to the working environment and safety in a demanding and risky offshore industry. 

Optimist

In retirement, Åm is an optimist – with regard to the climate as well. “I’m very concerned with nature, but believe we should extract the resources its given us,” he told Otium in 2016. 

“Norway could have a long and good future in the oil and gas industry if people give it more support. Exploring for new deposits is important, but we should also seek to achieve a far better recovery factor from both new and existing fields.” 

“You can naturally concentrate on life’s negative aspects. Then everything’s simply awful. I think you’ll be a far happier person if you prefer to see the positive side of life. I call that self-motivation. We need more of that in the energy sector.”[REMOVE]Fotnote: https://api.optimum.no/sites/default/files/PDF/optimum-magasinet-2016.pdf 

Published 21. October 2019   •   Updated 21. October 2019
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Knut Ove Kristensen – veteran manager with his heart in HSE

person Kjersti Melberg, Norwegian Petroleum Museum. Based on an interview with Kristensen on 12 September 2019.
More than forty-five years of service on Ekofisk underpin Knut Ove Kristensen’s status as a pioneering leader on the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS). His involvement began in 1974 when he switched from a career at sea to become a process technician for Phillips Petroleum.
— Knut Ove Kristensen in conversation with process apprentice Fredrik Svindland Theissen (left) and operations manager Siri Friestad. Photo: ConocoPhillips
© Norsk Oljemuseum

Early promotion and trust followed, and he served as an offshore installation manager (OIM) for more than 33 years in the Greater Ekofisk Area. 

Plain-speaking

Kristensen recalls that he was a committed young man in the early 1970s – an open, curious and plain-speaking person who was not afraid to criticise health, safety and environmental (HSE) conditions. 

The working style he encountered offshore suited him well, ready as he was to speak his mind. “I’ve undoubtedly been a loud-mouth. I’m used to having zealous people in the Family With grand-parents and a father who served as mayors, which is perhaps why I don’t quite know when to keep quiet.” 

Thinking back to working conditions when he started in petroleum industry, he recalls living on Gulftide, Norway’s first production facility, and says it was fascinating. 

“This was an old jack-up rig, with the helideck installed on planks. We were four to a cabin, and things were pretty shabby. Primitive conditions prevailed, to put it mildly.” 

The workplace at the time was characterised by the presence of the Americans, and confusions frequently arose between them and those who were not particularly good at English. 

“It was very unusual,” reflects Kristensen. “We were trained up by the Americans, of course – they were the ones who knew about this business. There were a lot of misunderstandings among the Norwegians, people who pretended to understand the messages they were given about what jobs to do. Both serious and funny situations occured. Those of us who’d been to sea undoubtedly had an advantage in that we knew the language a bit better. The rest were fishermen and smallholders and ordinary people from the Districts in Western Norway who didn’t speak much English. Offshore terminology wasn’t easy for people who didn’t have the language.” 

He quickly grasped the ethos in this working environment. “The Americans often only gave you one chance. If you showed that you could cope with your job, you won trust, new opportunities and more responsibility.” 

Given his background in the Norwegian merchant marine, however, Kristensen reacted negatively to a number of the conditions which prevailed at the time. “I was one of the youngest then, and that wasn’t always easy because there were a number of older and more experienced people who felt they had a ‘monopoly of brains’,” he comments. “And quite a lot were pushy. “Working conditions weren’t orderly, with proper employment contracts like I was used to from my time at sea thanks to the Norwegian Seamen’s Union – unionisation and the like.” 

He adds that he is grateful for everything he learned from the Americans, but that they at the time were not particularly keen on unions and the Norwegian concept of collaboration between employers and employees. “They thought it was enough to enter into agreements on a mantoman basis or with the company, and saw no need to organise this via trade unions.” 

Involved

Given his views, it is not surprising that he became involved at an early stage with the Ekofisk Committee by serving as secretary to Øyvind Krokvik, who was first head of this union. 

Kristensen explains that he has been committed throughout his career to involvement and worker participation and to good collaboration between unions, the safety service and management. That was particularly important during the early years of the petroleum industry on the NCS, he emphasises. His experience of union work accompanied him into various senior posts on Ekofisk. 

With a gleam in his eye, he says the following about his promotion: “Acquiring managerial responsibility early on may have had something to do with my involvement with the union. Putting in place systems for worker participation and collaboration was particularly important in the early years of Norway’s offshore industry. 

“I played a part in establishing the parameters which govern industrial relations out on the field today, with unions and the safety delegate service.

I became the country’s youngest OIM at the age of 24, and served as a manager out there for 41 years.

They may have thought ‘he’s more trouble than we need, so we’ll just promote him up and then be quit him.” 

Kristensen reports that he has been preoccupied throughout his managerial career with ensuring that “things are genuine” – that a manager must understand and personally be part of “the home team”. He explains that as the ability to understand a position from the standpoint of the various parties involved, and adds that he has thrived offshore with a living and working community. This he defines as one “where you get close to people, where everyone is seen and heard, and where they understand that they play an important role in reaching a common goal”.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Pionèr, ONS 2018: 8. 

It did not take him long to learn how to adjust his management style to the offshore environment, but admits that this approach has developed over the years. The leadership culture which dominated on the platforms during the early years undoubtedly influenced me a bit. I was probably very inflexible and saw things in black-and-white, but have become more judicious and considered over time. 

“Nobody left my office earlier in any doubt about what I meant. I thought that saved a lot of time. But I can’t have been too bad, or I wouldn’t have held down the job for so long.” 

Strategy

Kristensen’s long service makes him unique on Ekofisk, and he has thought a lot about management. His expressed strategy has been to get people on side over HSE through commitment and integrity – and without any “second agenda”. 

“Working in the Ekofisk Complex with 600-700 people is an unusual experience,” he observes. “I held the same job as the man in charge for 20 years. “That means you’re ‘on stage’ the whole time, and attend 10-12 HSE meetings every week. You’ve got to get people committed, drive a doctrine and sell a message. This involves getting what people have to concentrate on implanted in their hearts and minds so they can contribute to their own safety and that of others, he explains. 

“You must be genuine, and your own integrity must be order. You have to build trust, and not least display respect for your audience.” 

“What’s been a powerful help for me is that I’m on the home team. I’ve been a skilled worker myself and have been through most things.” 

Kristensen emphasises several times that he regarded the unions, their elected officers and the safety delegates as a resource in this work. 

“The tripartite collaboration pursued in the petroleum industry between government, companies and unions functions very well,” he concludes.  “This is about informing and involving people, and ensuring that decisions aren’t taken over their heads. Our company has achieved that in a positive way.” 

“The fact that Ekofisk is a mature field and ConocoPhillips is a mature company also has something to do with it. Cooperation with the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway and other authorities is also very good.” 

Kristensen denies that union-management collaboration has become more strained during the downturns experienced by the petroleum industry. “Strained and strained – we must adjust to external conditions and try to protect the jobs needed to safeguard the industry. But nobody’s ever been made redundant by this company. That’s worthy of respect.

Downsizing has been solved with severance packages. People have often been given early retirement. From that perspective, it’s been a privilege to work for an operator company.” 

Commitment

After almost 46 years with the company, Kristensen’s commitment to continuous improvement, good safety and high production regularity is as strong as ever. Recognising that substantial progress has been made in the HSE area over the years he has worked in the industry, he affirms that this issue is closest to his heart. 

“We’ve staked out the path as we’ve advanced. We don’t accept incidents and accidents. We take a completely different approach to risk today. Accidents which do occur are used for all they’re worth in an effort to say to ourselves: ‘this has actually happened, but it’s our duty to learn from it’.” 

Kristensen has personally experienced accidents and injuries at close hand, and thereby knows the importance of preventive safety work to protect people, the environment and equipment. 

He will never forget some incidents – and immediately mentions the Alexander L Kielland disaster in 1980 With 123 casualties. An article in local daily Stavanger Aftenblad as recently as 2012, with photos of all those who have died on duty on the NCS since 1966, made a big impression on him. 

Britain’s Piper Alpha explosion in 1988, when 169 people were killed, is another major incident he recalls. His conclusion is that the petroleum sector has not been a Promised Land for all. 

The former OIM proudly mentions a number of HSE improvements which have partly been the result of technological advances in the industry during his time. But he warns about hazards which still exist, such as vessels drifting out of control. A well-known incident on New Year’s Eve in 2015 made a particularly strong impression on him. 

A 150000 tons, unmanned barge had come loose and was threatening to collide with installations on Ekofisk. Several hundred workers from this field and neighbouring Valhall were flown to safety and production was shut down. The barge passed the platforms at a distance of about one nautical mile, but Kristensen found the actual incident and the threat it posed frightening. 

“Drifting vessels which come loose in rough weather, which can get pretty challenging out there, are perhaps the biggest hazard we now face. Luckily we have good procedures to handle such challenges.” 

Reminder

Such incidents and near-misses are regarded by Kristensen as a reminder that the petroleum industry is under an obligation to learn the necessary lessons. He points to the potential for learning from other industries, and emphasises the good collaboration which prevails across the company. Mechanical handling provides a good example, he says. 

“Things can go terribly wrong. After fatal accidents in the 2000s, we established a work group which held monthly meetings. I took part as technical manager for these facilities. We involved everyone in the logistics chain on land, at the base and on the platforms. That attracted so much attention and such great improvements that we’ve now managed to prevent virtually all undesirable conditions in this area.” 

Despite good systems and routines, colleagues on the installations are Kristensen’s most important reminder of the responsibility he has had as an OIM on Ekofisk. 

“Experiences from my early years meant that I have become particularly attentive to HSE – and I was involved in quite a lot, of course. But this mostly relates to the individual who gets injured on your watch and on your shift – in other words, the people you work with. They stood on the drill floor and worked so that the sparks flew around their ears. Having only two-three fingers used to confer ‘status’. 

He notes that improvements have a lot to do with technological progress. Much risk has been eliminated by automating a great deal of the work which used to be done manually. 

“But we still have more than enough opportunities to injure ourselves. This has a lot to do with awareness – being present in the real world, making sure you’re focused. That’s actually expected for 12 hours at a time.” 

A respectful attitude to his big responsibilities and duties was maintained by Kristensen to his last working day. “Emergency preparedness is like being at war – you do what you’re told. But you feel it. Although we’ve trained so long at this, you’re still conscious of being responsible for several hundred lives. Taking a wrong decision could … You must act on the basis of the information you’ve got, not what you know many months later. When you tackle it, however, you get a sense of mastery at solving the problem together with an outstanding emergency response organisation on land. Ultimately, though, you’re the skipper on your own ship.” 

Time to reflect

Kristensen has finally retired from ConocoPhillips, giving him time to reflect over his own commitment and lifestyle offshore as it affected him and his family. 

“For my own part, I must say that it’s had a price,” he admits. “I couldn’t get involved in politics or organisations, for example. I was only at home half of the time. I followed up the kids when I was at home, of course, but never felt I could be active in associations and so on, contribute the way I’d have liked. 

He has found the transition to retirement unaccustomed in many ways. “Simply remembering that I’m not going offshore is a big change, for example. I had to deal with so many challenges right up to my last day at work that it’s been impossible to prepare anything. I ought to have thought about and planned retirement a bit better, of course, but I’ll undoubtedly find something to do when I want to.” 

Published 21. October 2019   •   Updated 25. October 2019
© Norsk Oljemuseum
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Ekofisk 2/4 VC

person Norwegian Petroleum Museum
Injection water from subsea installation Ekofisk VC (Victor Charlie) began to be pumped down well VC-03 on 28 September 2018. Well number two came on line just under a week later. 
Kjappe fakta:
  • Plan for development and operation (PDO) was approved by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy on 7 September 2017.
  • Part of Ekofisk South
  • Installed September 2017
  • On stream September 2018
  • Gets electric power and signals from Ekofisk 2/4 M
  • Also called "Victor Charlie"
— Illustration of Ekofisk 2/4 VC (Victor Charlie). Illustration: ConocoPhillips
© Norsk Oljemuseum

The aim of this facility – an extension to the Ekofisk South project – was to increase waterflooding on the southern flank of the Ekofisk reservoir in order to maintain oil and gas production. 

An amended plan for development and operation (PDO) of Ekofisk South was approved by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy on 7 September 2017. 

This involved installing a new seabed template with four water injection wells, and represented a continuation of the well-established Ekofisk production strategy based on waterflooding.[REMOVE]Fotnote: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/okt-utvinning-pa-ekofiskfeltet/id2570011/. 

The template was installed in September 2017, with a technical solution similar to that used on the seabed facilities already installed – Ekofisk 2/4 VA and 2/4 VB.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Pionér, no 2, ConocoPhillips, 2018.

In addition to the structure itself, including wellheads and Xmas trees, the installation comprised control modules with umbilicals connected to the existing waterflooding system. 

The 2/4 VC facility receives injection water from Eldfisk 2/7 E, while power and control signals come from Ekofisk 2/4 M. It is run from the Ekofisk 2/4 K control room. 

When fully developed, overall injection capacity for this subsea installation will be 80 000 barrels per day through the four wells. 

The water pipeline and umbilical to 2/4 VB were extended to 2/4 VC. Well operations on the latter began on 24 May 2018 with a view to starting injection before the end of the year. 

Published 15. October 2019   •   Updated 15. October 2019
© Norsk Oljemuseum
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Ekofisk from 2008 to 2017

person by the Norwegian Petroleum Museum
Click through the photo carousel under the look-up from year to year from 2008 to 2017.
It shows the development of the Ekofisk area with platforms, pipelines and underwater installations.
— 2017
© Norsk Oljemuseum

This slideshow requires JavaScript.

Do you want to see the development of the Ekofisk area from 1971 to 2001 click here.

Published 7. October 2019   •   Updated 14. October 2019
© Norsk Oljemuseum
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Ekofisk from 1971 to 2001

person Norwegian Petroleum Museum
Click through the image carousel below the lookup image.
It shows the development of the Ekofisk area from year to year from the start with the first production in 1971 until 2001.
© Norsk Oljemuseum

To follow the development of the field further from 2008 to 2017 click here.

 

Published 7. October 2019   •   Updated 8. October 2019
© Norsk Oljemuseum
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Ekofisk 2/4 Z

person Norwegian Petroleum Museum
This installation is a wellhead platform in the Ekofisk Complex.
Kjappe fakta:
  • Wellhead platform
  • Installed summer of 2013, on stream 25 October
  • Also known as Ekofisk Zulu
— Ekofisk 2/4 Z. Photo: ConocoPhillips/Norwegian Petroleum Museum
© Norsk Oljemuseum

This platform rests on a steel jacket built by Dragados at Cadiz in Spain. The module support frame (MSF) and topsides were fabricated by Energomontaz at Gdansk in Poland and completed at Kværner Egersund. 

The topsides were installed in July 2013. Petroleum and energy minister Tord Lien performed the official inauguration of 2/4 Z and the Ekofisk South project on 29 October 2013,13 just four days after the platform came on stream.14 

No control room is provided on 2/4 Z, but it has a local equipment room (LER) which is not permanently manned. The platform is monitored and remotely controlled from the control room on Ekofisk 2/4 J, but can also be run from the operations centre in Tananger.

2013-10 – Historisk dag for Ekofisk og Norge åpning av Ekofisk 2-4 Z – regjeringen-no

Published 1. October 2019   •   Updated 25. October 2019
© Norsk Oljemuseum
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Ekofisk 2/4 VB

person by Gunleiv Hadland, Norwegian Petroleum Museum
The 2/4 VB subsea installation began injecting water in May 2013, three kilometres south of the Ekofisk Complex. It formed part of the Ekofisk South project approved by the Storting (parliament) in 2010.
Kjappe fakta:
  • Ekofisk 2/4 VB was a part of the Ekofisk South project
  • Installed 2012
  • Producing May 16. 2013
  • Also called “Victor Bravo”
— Ekofisk 2/4 VB (Victor Bravo) lowered into the sea. Photo: Bob Bartlett/ConocoPhillips
© Norsk Oljemuseum

 So successful had the 2/4 VA facility proved to be that it was copied for 2/4 VB as an eight-well template, also delivered by FMC at Kongsberg.

Similarly, the wells on 2/4 VB were drilled by Maersk Innovator. The well operation department completed installation of the template, manifolds and casing for the eight subsea wells.

Seabed installations carried out by Subsea 7 comprised a five-kilometre pipeline for water from the Eldfisk Complex as well as a diver-installed T piece welded into the existing pipeline from Eldfisk 2/7 E to Ekofisk 2/4 K.

This assignment also covered laying three kilometres of umbilicals combining hydraulic lines and fibreoptic cables from 2/4 VA, so that 2/4 VB could also be remotely operated from land.

Published 23. September 2019   •   Updated 7. February 2020
© Norsk Oljemuseum
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What’s in a name

person By Björn Lindberg
Confusion can easily arise over the terms used in connection with Ekofisk, where the Greater Ekofisk Area (GEA) is a collective designation for a cluster of no less than eight fields. The largest of these is Ekofisk itself.
— Older poster showing The Greater Ekofisk area. Illustration: ConocoPhillips/Norwegian Petroleum Museum
© Norsk Oljemuseum
Kjære barn har samme navn, kart
The Greater Ekofisk Area (GEA) and its constituent fields lie primarily lie in PL 018 (red frame). Those with dotted boundaries have ceased production, while those with lilac borders were producing at 29 August 2019. Note that Valhall and Hod in the south-east corner of the map are not part of the GEA.

Primarily located in production licence PL 018, along with Ekofisk, the other seven fields are West Ekofisk, Tor, Eldfisk, Albuskjell, Edda, Cod and Embla. 

Furthermore, six of the eight – with Embla and Cod as the exception – comprise two geological formations. One is known as the Ekofisk formation, with the Tor formation as the other. See the article on sea scurf. 

The graph in figure 2, which presents collective production of oil, gas and condensate over time in million standard cubic metres of oil equivalent (scm oe), shows Ekofisk’s dominant position – both historically and today.

Kjære barn har samme navn, grav
Historical production from the Ekofisk area since the start of output in 1971 until the end of 2018. The base data were acquired from the norskpetroleum.no website on 29 August 2019.

With the exception of four years, overall output from the seven other fields has never achieved the same volume as Ekofisk’s own production. 

The effect of waterflooding on Ekofisk, which got going seriously in 1987, can be clearly seen in the production curve. This rose from less than 10 million scm oe per annum to more than 20 million. 

On 1 July 2019, operator ConocoPhillips submitted a plan for development and operation (PDO) which covered reopening the Tor field (Tor II). 

This will involve the investment of about NOK 6 billion, with a planned production start in late 2020, and is expected to yield an estimated 10 million scm oe. 

Furthermore, the licensees have initiated concept studies for further development of the northern flank of Eldfisk (Eldfisk II). Both subsea solutions and a simple unmanned platform are under consideration.[REMOVE]Fotnote: https://petro.no/nyheter/conocophillips-vurderer-a-bygge-ny-plattform-pa-eldfisk-nord  

Development of the Tommeliten Alpha formation, which has only ranked as a discovery so far, is also being assessed.[REMOVE]Fotnote:  https://petro.no/nyheter/forbereder-mulig-utbygging-tommeliten-alpha  

Published 23. September 2019   •   Updated 9. October 2019
© Norsk Oljemuseum
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